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Abstract: This paper seeks to analyse cultural trauma theories 
and their consequences as well as their potential applicability to 
cases of collective trauma where access to the legal arena in the 
rehabilitation process is not possible. When ‘state terror’ occurs, 
such as in Latin America, or, more arguably Italy, access to the 
legal arena is systematically denied through a variety of criminal 
strategies. In these cases, the cultural working through of trauma 
takes place on the aesthetic level. What are the consequences 
of this process both for the inscription of the crucial event in public 
discourse and for its relationship with justice? Moreover, how 
do aesthetic codes affect the public definition of justice and a 
collective understanding of what happened?
Introduction1
A new wave of international terrorism has emerged in the 
wake of the attacks of September 11, March 11 and July 7 affecting 
our common perceptions of risk, justice and everyday life. These 
attacks challenged existing ideas about the state, war, torture, prison, 
human rights and presented a host of new questions for intellectuals, 
social scientists, artists, politicians and common citizens to consider. 
The question of how to locate terror in the public space is a complex 
question but it can be analysed by considering the nature itself of 
the aesthetic codes used to transform a place of violence into a 
space of collective remembering. This process of transforming place 
is shaped by the performative nature of the narratives used in the 
different national contexts. The sensitive nature of these places can 
1     I wish to thank Gillian Duncan and Nicole Ives-Allison for their very interesting 
suggestions and comments to my article. It was a very enriching experience to work with 
them for the publication of this article. It is not ritual thank to the editor of the journal and 
the editor of the special issue, but the final version of this article is much better than that 
originally submitted thanks to the referees’ suggestions and the comments offered by 
Nicole and Gillian.
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be analysed by looking at the social and public trajectories of the 
commemorative sites planned and constructed where the terror 
attack occurred. Cultural symbols and artistic codes become resources 
for articulating the struggles over the past that help shape national 
and collective identities, as Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz’s study on 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington (1991) has documented. 
In contemporary societies cultural codes are often asked to actively 
intervene in the public definition of “crucial events”, such as wars, 
terrorist attacks, disasters.  These events characteristically impact 
the social collective and usually requires a length period of public 
recuperation following such traumatic events. The cultural codes shape 
both the contemporary representation of a crucial event and its future 
public memory. 
This article analyses cultural theories such as those offered by 
Alexander et al (2004). It will examine the consequences of these 
theories and their applicability to those cases where the access to the 
legal arena is not available for working through cultural trauma. Where 
there have been claims of “state terror”, such as in Latin America 
and Italy, access to the legal arena is systematically denied through 
a variety of criminal strategies. In Italy, for example, there is a long 
history of state collusion between part of the government and criminal 
groups like the mafia and the camorra. This collusion has deeply 
affected the functioning of the legal system that normally represents 
the most important arena for the expression of collective trauma. 
When this mode of expression is denied, the expression of trauma is 
pushed outside the formal legal and political system and into an anti-
system, historically artistic/cultural productions.  In these cases, cultural 
elaboration of the trauma takes place on the aesthetic level and the 
memories culturally produced are very often counter-memories. What 
are the consequences of this process both for the inscription of the 
crucial event in the public discourse and its relation with justice? And 
moreover, how do the aesthetic codes affect the public definition of 
justice and the collective understanding of what happened? 
Cultural Trauma in Theory
Over the course of the last two decades, the relationship 
between trauma and memory has been analysed by several scholars. 
(Caruth 1995, 1996; Laub 1995; Felman 1995)2 Cultural Trauma and 
2     The critique provided here of Alexander’s cultural trauma model and the description 
of his theory provided here have previously been published in slightly amended from in: A 
L Tota, “Review Essay – Public Memory and Cultural Trauma,”Javanost – The Public 13, no 
3 (2006): 84-86.
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Collective Memory edited by Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser and 
Sztompka (Alexander et al, 2004) represents one of the most successful 
attempts to draw a systematic theory that further investigates the 
relationship between memory, identity and public discourse. This work 
analyses the ways in which hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
memories seek to serve as constitutive bases for the collective identity 
formation as well as the extent to which they succeed in doing so. 
Alternatively put, the cultural trauma model essentially concerns itself 
with how a traumatic past acquires meaning in the public discourse 
and can become a semantic resource for the definition of collective 
identities. Under what circumstances does this process occur? When 
and how does a traumatic event (such as a terrorist attack) forever 
mark collective memories and identities? 
Along with Cultural Trauma and Collective Memory, Eyerman’s 
2001 study on the cultural trauma caused by slavery documents 
cultural trauma theories’ relevance. It is Smelser, in his contribution 
to Alexander et al’s work, who provides a useful formal definition of 
cultural trauma:
…a memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant 
membership group and evoking an event or situation that is a) laden 
with negative affect, b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded 
as threatening a society’s existence or violating one or more of its 
fundamental cultural presuppositions. (Smelser, 2004: 44)
Alexander, along similar lines, argues that, “cultural trauma occurs 
when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to 
a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group 
consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their 
future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.” (Alexander, 
2004: 1) When one examines Cultural Trauma and Collective Memory 
as a whole, two key hypotheses emerge. Firstly, there is the idea that 
collective trauma is a historical construct and not a naturally occurring 
phenomenon. The second hypothesis purports that there is a great 
difference between individual and social trauma. This latter point is 
something which is directly addressed by Smelser:
… a cultural trauma differs greatly from a psychological trauma in terms of 
the mechanisms that establish and sustain it. The mechanisms associated 
with psychological trauma are the intra-psychic dynamics of defence, 
adaptation, coping, and working through; the mechanisms at the cultural 
level are mainly those of social agents and contending groups. (Smelser, 
2004: 38-39)
When it is argued that trauma is cultural, what does this truly 
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mean? There exists a gap between an event and its subsequent 
representation, a discrepancy or empty space, which can be 
conceived of as the trauma process. For trauma to grow beyond the 
individual level and emerge at a cultural one, a new ‘master narrative’ 
must be established successfully by a carrier group that, “projects the 
trauma claim to the audience-public.” (Alexander, 2004,:12) There are 
four questions which must be addressed by a successful process of 
collective representation of the traumatic event: (1) The nature of the 
pain; (2) The nature of the victim; (3) The relation of the trauma victim 
to the wider audience and; (4) Attribution of responsibility. The cultural 
trauma model also identifies and describes six institutional arenas where 
the meanings of trauma are socially constructed: religious, aesthetic, 
legal, scientific, mass media, and state bureaucracy. 
In short, the trauma process links to the creation of public 
memory from trauma. It is argued here that the trauma process 
influences collective memories and national identities, especially to the 
extent that the trauma is inscribed in public discourse. The analytical 
categories devised to analyse the functioning of the trauma process 
can also usefully investigate the formation of a public discourse around 
a traumatic past.  Still, the cultural trauma theory also raises questions 
warranting further investigation. In some national contexts access to 
one or more key institutional arenas may be systematically denied 
leaving aesthetic codes are the only ones available to represent 
traumatic events (as we will see in the empirical studies mentioned 
in this article). What might be the consequences of such systematic 
exclusion of, for example, the legal or the media arena for the public 
sphere? What role does power play in this model? For Alexander, 
different social networks offer different levels of distributional access to 
material and symbolic resources. He argues, “the constraints imposed 
by institutional arenas are mediated by the uneven distribution of 
material resources and the social networks that provide differential 
access to them.” (Alexander, 2004: 21)
Critiquing and Applying the Cultural Trauma Model to Italian Terror
One key remaining question is the extent to which the theory 
can be generalised for, “it would be a serious misunderstanding if 
trauma theory were restricted in its reference to Western social life.” 
(Alexander, 2004: 24) Alexander offers the example of the rape of 
Nanking as a case where the collective memories never fully extended 
beyond China. The lack of recognition of traumas and the subsequent 
failure to inscribe their lessons in the public sphere depend in these 
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cases on:
 an inability to carry through…the trauma process. In Japan and China, 
just as in Rwanda, Cambodia and Guatemala, claims have certainly been 
made for the central relevance of these ‘distant sufferings’ … But for both 
social structural and cultural reasons, carrier groups have not emerged 
with the resources, authority, or interpretive competence to powerfully 
disseminate these trauma claims. (Alexander, 2004: 27) 
But is it useful to analyse the lack of public discourse in relation to the 
rape of Nanking in such a way?  Though Alexander describes his theory 
as ‘middle-range,’ his conclusion seems to contradict this claim: 
Collective traumas have no geographical or cultural limitations. The theory 
of cultural trauma applies, without prejudice, to any and all instances 
when societies have, or have not, constructed and experienced cultural 
traumatic events, and to their efforts to draw, or not to draw, the moral 
lessons that can be said to emanate from them. (Alexander, 2004: 27)  
The potential for application of this theory to non-Western 
societies remains uncertain. When looking at non-Western societies, and 
even some Western ones (such as South Italy), it may be misleading 
to speak of, “The inability to carry through the trauma process.” (Tota, 
2006: 86) In order for the trauma process to emerge a carrier group 
needs also to have national and/or collective will in the public arena 
to deal with the public meaning of that trauma. For example, in some 
African societies the destiny of the entire population is decided outside 
the national context and depends on the international exploitation 
of the national resources. Would it be possible in this type of context 
for a carrier group of collective memory to emerge and successfully 
compete with the instigated amnesia provoked by the perpetrators of 
the trauma?
A useful example is the case of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Nigerian writer 
arrested and hanged in 1995 by the military government of general 
Sani Abacha.  The collective work on this case documents the extent 
to which, and under what circumstances, civil society can (or cannot) 
intervene in Nigerian national public discourse. In 1996, Jenny Green, 
a lawyer at the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York brought 
forth a lawsuit against Shell to demonstrate the involvement of the 
multinational oil company in the execution of Saro-Wiwa. In 2009 Shell 
agreed, in an out-of-court settlement, to pay $15.5 million (11.1 million 
euro) in compensation to victims’ families.  International solidarity 
facilitated collective work in this case. To summarise in other words, 
civil society cannot fully affect the public discourse in countries where 
violence and injustice prevail and citizens risk their life if they stand in 
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opposition to existing sources of power.  
For a victim to become an active interpreter in the process 
of constructing public memory of trauma (taken to mean his/her 
discursive construction within the public sphere), he or she must first 
to stop being a victim. In other words, the specific trauma must be 
terminated, and the condition of victimhood must cease. Nevertheless, 
in some national contexts the level of violence is such that the victims 
of a particular cultural trauma continue endlessly to be victims. This 
happens not only in African countries, but also in the city of Naples.  
The violence has never stopped. In such circumstances, it is difficult 
to imagine that the victims can be usefully analysed by applying the 
concept of ‘carrier group.’ 
According to Alexander this concept is one of the elements 
of the trauma process, the others being the audience and the 
situation. (Alexander, 2004: 12) The carrier group is the speaker in the 
trauma process and its main goal is “to project the trauma claim to 
the audience public,” by using, “the particularities of the historical 
situation, the symbolic resources at hand, and the constraints and 
opportunities provided by institutional structures.” (Alexander, 2004: 12) 
The fact that the theory falters when applied to these cases is a cause 
for reflection: it seems that the ‘carrier group’ can rarely emerge in 
such circumstances. This perhaps means that we are using a concept 
whose explanatory capacity varies according to the context in which 
it is applied. The effective processing of a cultural trauma entails the 
possibility of constructing public knowledge on that traumatic past. 
Public memory is the memory of the public sphere. But, is the concept 
of public sphere useful for analysis of the genocide in Rwanda or for the 
analysis of the relation between camorra and citizens in Naples? Only 
to the extent that we can say that democracy does not freely exist 
in there, that its civil society has been annihilated and its intellectuals 
exterminated. In short, a Habermasian public sphere is not only of little 
help in understanding what has happened in Rwanda, but also what 
has happened when mafia (or ‘cosa nostra’) and camorra are at work 
in South Italy. 
The mafia is a criminal organization originating in Sicily to 
indicate an organised criminal network sharing a common code of 
conduct and organizational. In the 80s Giovanni Falcone and Paolo 
Borsellino, two Italian magistrates who would both be murdered by 
mafia some years later, started a campaign against ‘cosa nostra,’ 
arresting Tommasso Buscetta, a mafioso who became an informant in 
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exchange for protection. Thanks to Buscetta’ statements it was possible 
to document the infiltration of the mafia in the state and the Italian 
judiciary. In a second phase, ‘mafia’ has become a generic term for 
any organised criminal network with similarities in structure, methods 
and interests to the original Sicilian organisations. The camorra, on the 
other hand, is a criminal organization, very similar to ‘cosa nostra’ that 
originated in the region of Campania in South Italy. Naples, the capital 
of the region, serves as a hub of its activity. It is among the largest and 
oldest criminal organizations in Italy, dating back to the 18th century. 
Compared to the mafia, whose structure is pyramidal, the camorra’s 
organization structure is more horizontal than vertical, with individual 
clans acting largely autonomously. 
One of the main criminal strategies of the camorra consists of 
becoming the preferred interlocutors of local politicians and public 
officials. The camorra clans assist and protect their clients against the 
local authorities. Infiltration, especially within local government, is very 
deep. Due to the complexity of this context, civil society in Sicily or in 
Naples cannot intervene effectively in the public discourse because 
citizens are under threat. In intervention they risk their own life and that 
of their family. In very specific sub-national contexts such as urban 
Naples, which is dominated by the camorra, it is difficult to apply the 
cultural trauma models and the concept of ‘carrier group’ as pointed 
out in Alexander’s theory. As a matter of fact, in this case violence 
needs to stop and victims need to stop of being victims in order to work 
through the trauma process. But here the camorra does not allow it 
and the consequences are the public denial of a collective trauma. 
In Naples the citizens who decide to engage in this public discourse 
of the past risk camorra retaliations. The cultural trauma theories in all 
other cases instead prove efficacious. In light of these considerations, 
a reasonable proposal seems to be that of having cultural trauma 
theory converse with part of the post-colonial debate, so as to avoid 
generalizations that, far from confirming this important theory, instead 
weaken it.
Terrorism in Italy
 Since 1994 the inscription of cultural trauma in the Italian public 
discourse has been extensively studied in several pieces of qualitative 
research. (Tota, 2005a; Tota, 2005b; Tota 2010) In relation to the specific 
theoretical case proposed at the very beginning of this text, the 
inscription in the public discourse of a cultural trauma in cases where 
access to the legal and the political arenas is denied, two different 
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cases will be here considered: (1) State terror; and (2) Imperfect silence 
and the public denial of a terrorist attack. These cultural traumas have 
a direct impact on democracy, especially for terrorist attacks where 
the state is somehow considered guilty. 
 In earlier research I have offered a classification scheme for 
terrorist attacks which complements that of Tilly (2005). (Tota, 2005a) It 
is, on one hand, it based on the degree to which public representation 
of the state changes as a side effect of terrorist attacks. On the other 
hand it is based on the number and diversity of the contrasting versions 
of the event recounted by the public: 
… the first variable may vary along the following public perceptions of the 
role of the state: a) state as guilty of not being able to defend its citizens; 
b) state as guilty of not being able to prosecute terrorists; c) state as guilty 
of having no political and institutional willingness to pursue the terrorists; d) 
state as mandatory of the terror attacks.” (Tota, 2005a: 57). 
The term terrorism can refer to a range very different situations, from 
September 11 to cases of State Terror in Italy (Tota, 2003) and Latin 
America. (Oliverio and Lauderdale, 2005) This highlights the fact, 
something stressed by Tilly, that models based in the 9/11 attacks 
cannot be considered inherently generalisable, for the bulk of attacks 
the world over do not share key characteristics with those particular 
attacks. (Tilly, 2005)
The second variable, instead, varies along this continuum: a) low conflict 
over the public version of the past (the case of September 11 2001); b) 
medium conflict (Madrid 11 March, first attributed to the Basque separatist 
terrorists (ETA) and secondly to Al Qaeda); c) high conflict over the 
public version of the past (the Italian attacks in 1980). The first variable 
makes us focus on the potential counter-memories (i.e. public memories 
constructed by and in society and contrasting with the “official version” 
provided by the state). The second one, instead, introduces  the problem 
of the time perspective. (Tota 2005a, 57). 
Here the focus is on the processes that can, and have, lead to the 
more or less official attribution of an attack to an identified group of 
terrorists. 
The First Case: ‘State Terror’ in Italy (1969-1993) and the Hypothesis of 
CIA Involvement
The period of modern Italian history extending from 1969 to 1993 
is characterised by a perception of the state as unable to defend 
its citizens, lacking the political and institutional willingness to pursue 
terrorists and, in some cases, as the instigating terror attacks. Violence 
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and terror were used during this period as political strategies with which 
to obtain political consensus in a process commonly referred to as ‘the 
strategy of tension’. Access to the legal arena has been frequently 
denied and numerous terrorists have not yet been prosecuted. In 
many cases even after decades there have not been any convictions. 
Terrorist attacks have entered the public discourse only through their 
cultural depictions (films, theatre productions, exhibitions, public 
concerts). In light of Alexander’s model (2004) it can be argued that 
the cultural process has been enacted in the artistic arena. 
Terrorist organizations have been very active in Italy since 
1970, with numerous attacks resulting in many deaths including mass 
casualties caused by bombings in railway stations, in the central 
squares of cities. There is a long list of such terrorist attacks, but most 
Italian citizens have forgotten this chapter in Italy’s past. As Dickie and 
Foot emphasise:
The extent and duration of  the period of the stragi in postwar Italy have 
no real precedent in contemporary Europe. The series of peacetime 
outrages that marked the 1969-84 period cannot be compared with the 
effects of various coups or civil wars in other southern European countries. 
Only in Italy did the “strategy of tension” last for so long and cause so 
much damage within a democratic system. Only in Italy do many of these 
outrages remain a mystery to this day. Few of the protagonists of the 
postwar stragi … have ever been convicted. Many were not even tried. 
(Dickie and Foot, 2002: 46)
In the Italian case, ‘strategy of tension’ has come to denote the 
past three decades of internal terrorist attacks in Italy. Yet, as alluded to 
above, behind this veneer lies a strategy of terror and violence pursued 
by an extremist part of the ‘democratic’ state and secret services in 
order to gain and maintain a political consensus unobtainable through 
democratic elections. Surprisingly, despite the frequency of terrorist 
attacks, there has been a forgetting of this recent past. Numerous 
Italian citizens, especially younger ones, cannot remember key 
details of these tragedies – dates, victims, location. Cuore, a satrical 
magazine, published a series of student essays on the massacre in 
Piazza Fontana (Milan, December 12 1969) in 1992. It was evident that  
the majority of these students had no idea of what happened only 
twenty-three years previously (Foot, 2002). 
Yet the real problem is not forgetfulness, because as Foot argues 
in his study on the explosion in Piazza Fontana, “you cannot forget 
something you have never learned.” (Foot, 2002: 276) The Italian public 
lacks understanding of the country’s recent history. Since 1970 these 
deaths and massacres have not been included in the nation’s public 
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discourse. This absence of collective awareness has been the ‘natural’ 
consequence of various forms of amnesia instigated in the past and 
today. It is interesting to note that at the international level there is  also 
a lack of awareness of there being any terrorism of this kind in Italy. In 
the international public debate on contemporary Italian history only the 
crimes of Red Brigades and mafia have been properly inscribed. Why 
is this the case? One hyphotesis, often drawn but never proven, is that 
the ‘strategy of tension’ has been made possible in the Italian context 
due to a degree of cooperation between a deviant part of the Italian 
secret service and the activities of the international secret services, 
especially a deviant part of the American secret services (CIA). There 
would be an analogy between what happened in the 70s years in 
South America (for example, the case Salvador Allende in Chile) 
and Italy, even if in the Italian case the democratic state has been 
mantained. During the second term of office of Democratic President 
Bill Clinton, the CIA acknowledged having played a role in Chilean 
politics prior to the coup, but its degree of involvement is still debated. 
Perhaps in the future the CIA will also acknowledge having played a 
role in Italian politics during the strategy of tension. 
Aldo Moro, Prime Minister of Italy from 1963 to 1968, was 
kidnapped from Red Brigades on March 16 1968 and assassinated after 
55 days of captivity. In an extract from the report of the Red Brigades 
on their interrogation during Moro’s imprisonment, he underlines the role 
of associate countries in the strategy of tension: 
The so-called strategy of tension had the purpose, although fortunately 
not attained, to put Italy in the tracks of the” normality “after the events of 
‘68 and the so-called ‘hot autumn’. It can be assumed that the associated 
countries interested in various ways to our policy and therefore interested 
in sponsoring a certain political address were somehow involved through 
their services. (Commissione Stragi, Memoriale Aldo Moro, 2, 360). 
On November 14, 1974 Pier Paolo Pasolini, an Italian intellectual, 
writer, filmmaker and poet published a long article under the headline, 
“What is this Golpe? I know” in Corriere della Sera, one of Italy’s leading 
newspaper in Italy. It has been considered his death sentence. Pasolini 
was beaten to death on November 2, 1975 on the beach at Ostia, near 
Rome. Giuseppe Pelosi, a seventeen-year-old hustler, was arrested. 
He confessed to Pasolini’s murder. On May 7, 2005 Giuseppe Pelosi 
retracted his confession, which he said was made under the threat 
of violence to his family. This is the part of Pasolini’s article, where he 
mentions the role of CIA in the Italian strategy of tension:
I know. I know the names of those responsible for what has been called a 
coup (and what was in fact a series of coups set up as a power protection 
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system). I know the names of those responsible for the bloodbath of Milan 
on December 12th 1969. I know the names of those responsible for the 
atrocities of Brescia and Bologna in the early months of 1974. I know the 
names of the group of powerful people who, thanks to the CIA’s help … 
have first created (besides failing miserably) an anti-Communist crusade, 
to buffer the ‘68 and later, again with the help and inspiration of the CIA, 
have recovered a fascist virginity to reverse the disaster of the ‘referendum’ 
… I know the names of those who, between one church Mass and another, 
have given orders to, and guaranteed the political protection of, old 
Generals (kept in reserve, ready for a coup d’état), of young neo-fascists, 
or rather neo-nazis (to create a real base of anti-Communist tension) and 
lastly of common criminals … I know all the names and I know what they 
are guilty of (attacks on institutions and public bloodbaths). I know. But I 
have no proof. I have not one clue. Probably - if American power will allow 
it - maybe deciding ‘diplomatically’ to grant to another democracy the 
same that American democracy has granted about Nixon - these names 
sooner or later will be revealed. I know because I am an intellectual, a 
writer who tries to follow what is happening, to read everything that is 
written, to imagine things nobody admits to knowing or things that are 
left unsaid. I link distant facts, I put together the shattered and scrambled 
pieces of a whole, coherent political picture that puts logic back where 
arbitrariness, madness and mystery seem to reign … After all, it is not that 
difficult to reconstruct the truth about what has been happening in Italy 
since 1968… (Pier Paolo Pasolini, “What is this coup? I know,” Corriere della 
Sera, November 14, 1974).
During the trial for Pasolini’s murder Guido Calvi, layer of the 
prosecution, said: 
Why did Pasolini cease to exist? Indeed, one does not need to be an 
intellectual or a storyteller to acquire the awareness that drove Pasolini’s 
pen that day. Millions of Italians “know”, and every day in city squares, 
factories, schools, everywhere, they express their dissent, fruit of their 
knowledge. In the same way, we know who are the real instigators and the 
“ideal” perpetrators of the assassination of Pasolini, as they stand behind 
the scenes of this apologue. And the crowd of romans full of anguish and 
rage who came to say their last goodbye in Campo de’ Fiori, they knew. 
That crowd, so heterogeneous, so “roman”, so popular and therefore so 
“unreliable”, they knew and they know. But like us, they have no proof. 
Only a few clues. (part of the discourse held by Guido Calvi during the trial 
on April 24, 1976, published by www.pasolini.net)
Boschetti and Ciammitti (2010) in their book on the Bologna 
terrorist attack explicitly propose the hypothesis of there being a direct 
involvement of international secret services, mainly CIA. According 
to the authors, during the strategy of tension in Italy the NAR (Nuclei 
Armati Revolutionari), a neo-fascist terroristic group found guilty for 
many attacks (including that in Bologna railway station on August 2, 
1980 which killed 85 persons) have played a central role as point of 
connection between the Italian secret services, the CIA and a group 
of Italian politicians who wanted to prevail in Italy’s right-wing political 
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parties, even through a coup. 
On December 7 1970 there was a failed coup d’état in Italy 
known as the Golpe Borghese, derived from the name of the fascist 
Prince Junio Valerio Borghese who was its main organizer. It took until 
March 18 1971 for the coup attempt to became public knowledge, 
thanks an article in the left-wing journal Paese sera entitled: “Subversive 
plan against the Republic: far-right plot discovered.” It has to be 
noted that December 7 is the anniversary of the Pearl Harbour attack. 
(December 7, 1941) Probably the plan of the coup in its final phase 
envisaged the involvement of US and NATO warships on alert in the 
Mediterranean sea, but this remains a hypothesis. 
The most detailed study on the role of NATO’s secret armies and 
terrorism in Western Europe comes courtesy of Daniele Ganser, a Swiss 
historian who has investigated the role of a ‘stay-behind’ paramilitary 
organization with the official aim of countering a possible Soviet 
invasion of Europe. (Ganser, 2005) This organization has been called 
‘Gladio’ and its origin can be traced in the alleged ‘anti-communist 
NATO protocols’ committing the various secret services of NATO 
member states to prevent communist parties from coming to power 
in Western Europe by any means. According to Ganser, CIA director 
Allen Dulles was one of the key people instituting Gladio with the CIA 
having financed most Gladio operationss. During the Cold War era this 
paramilitary organization was charged with limiting Soviet influence 
within Europe. 
In Italy the existence and the activities of Gladio were firstly 
revealed on October 24 1980 by Giulio Andreotti, an Italian politician 
of the Christian Democracy party. Andreotti, who died in 2013, served 
seven times as Prime Minister including during Aldo Moro’s kidnapping 
and assassination by the Red Brigades. He also served eight times as 
Minister of Defense. On that occasion he defined Gladio as a structure 
of defense, information and safety. On his very controversial life a film 
has been devoted: “Il Divo” directed by Paolo Sorrentino (2008). This 
film documents the deep influence of Giulio Andreotti on the Italian 
recent past with a special focus on the strategy of tension and the 
relation between mafia and state. However, the existence of Gladio 
in Europe had been already revealed by William Colby (1978), CIA 
director from 1973 to 1975, in a volume dedicated to his life in CIA. 
This is the very complex national and international context that can 
be useful to better understand the terrorist attacks in Italy from 1969 
until 1993. There are no direct proofs, but several clues that make 
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the hypothesis of CIA’s involvement plausible. Perhaps the day of an 
official acknowledgement by CIA in relation to its role in Italy during 
the strategy of tension will soon arrive. American and European citizens 
deserve to know the truth.
 
In the following table the terrorist attacks of the strategy of tension 
period are listed. However, in this list the names of the perpetrators are 
missing. This is because in most cases they are still unknown.
Table 1: Terrorist attacks in Italy during the “Strategy of Tension “ period, 
1969- 1993
Date Place Number of Victims
12 Dec 1969 Milan (piazza Fontana) 16 dead, 84 injured
22 July 1970 Gioia Taura (train) 6 dead, 72 injured
31 May 1972 Peteano di Sagrado 3 dead, 1 injured
17 May 1973 Milan 4 dead, 76 injured
28 May 1974 Brescia (piazza della Loggia) 8 dead, 103 injured
4 Aug 1974 San Benedetto Val di Sambro, Italicus 12 dead, 44 injured
27 June 1980 Ustica Airplaine, DC9 81 dead
2 Aug 1980 Bologna Railway Station 85 dead, 200 injured
23 Dec 1984 San Benedetto Val di Sambro, Train 904 15 dead, 267 injured
27 May 1993 Florence (Georgofili) 5 dead, 41 injured
27 July 1993 Milan (Palestro) 5 dead, 14 injured
But not all acts of terrorism have been forgotten in Italy. There 
are several differences in the ways in which these crucial events have 
been inscribed or, otherwise dealt with, in Italian public discourse. 
However, notwithstanding the marked differences, one discerns a 
common pattern that can be taken as a concise representation of 
what happened. In all cases, the trauma process (i.e. the gap between 
the event and its public representation) could not be carried out in 
the legal and in the political arenas, but only in the aesthetic ones, 
because the Italian secret services have systematically misled the 
investigation of the judiciary. When a magistrate was about to discover 
the truth, the trial was moved to a new city. So a new magistrate 
had to take up the case and in fact start the investigation from the 
beginning. This was, for example, the case of the investigations related 
to the bombing in Milan, Piazza Fontana (December 12, 1969). The trial 
was moved from Milan to Rome. Other magistrates were murdered 
because their investigations were too efficient and effective. For 
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example, neo-fascist terrorists murdered the Italian magistrate Mario 
Amato in June 23, 1980  (a few weeks before the Bologna massacre 
of 2 August 1980). When he was assassinated, he was investigating the 
role of the NAR (black/fascist terrorists) and their relationship with the 
Italian and international secret services. He died before being able to 
reveal what he had discovered.
This prompts the following question: what are the main 
consequences of this process for a democracy? The public gains its 
knowledge of the recent Italian past from films and exhibitions, such 
is the case with Romanzo di una strage a film related to the bombing 
in Piazza Fontana directed by Marco Tullio Giordana in 2012.3 In other 
words, in order to understand past events in their country, Italian citizens 
must go to theatre, museums or the cinema. However at the end of 
it all, they were ‘just’ at theatre or at the cinema or in a museum. Put 
otherwise, public knowledge of this particular past has been produced 
through the aesthetic mode of production. This public knowledge has a 
‘degree of truth’ not comparable, for example, with that of traditional 
historical or political discourse. In the end, citizens will be induced to 
think that ‘perhaps it tells the truth, but it is only a film.’ Thus reaffirmed 
is ‘a conspiracy narrative’ in regard to those traumas, because the 
degree of reality produced through aesthetic codes is insufficient 
to compete with other narratives in the nation’s public discourse. 
Moreover, in most cases, the cultural memories generated in relation 
to the terrorist attacks are ‘counter-memories’. They are sometimes 
marginal voices, sometimes they can become hegemonic ones, but 
they are nevertheless counter-memories. (Foucault, 1977) When in a 
democracy a large portion of the recent past can only be recounted 
as ‘counter-memory,’ this is a fact which is likely to have a major 
impact on the collective identity of the entire nation. 
However, despite all the limitations mentioned, commemorative 
rituals in Italy are opportunities for civil and political society to contribute 
to the values of democracy. They are also significant for the hegemony 
process, in that they literally make democracy possible. Because in Italy 
the cultural trauma process can be carried out at least in the artistic 
arena, it is possible to reaffirm the ideal of belonging to a democratic 
state. Hence, ultimately, notwithstanding the above-mentioned limits,  
the cultural forms of these controversial pasts contribute to making 
democracy possible in Italy.
3  The film Romanzo di una strage (2012) also outlines the hypothesis of the 
relationship between NATO, international secret services, Italian ones and the NAR (Nuclei 
Armati Rivoluzionari). 
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Imperfect Silence and the Public Denial of the Event: The Christmas 
Attack, San Benedetto Val di Sambro, 1984
On December 23th 1984 in the Appennine base tunnel, a bomb on 
the 904 express train  from Napoli to Milan was detoned, killed 17 
and wounded 267.4 The location of this bombing was close to that of 
the Italicus express bombing ten years previously (on 4 August 1974). 
This is a case of great interest because it is the only one in which the 
Supreme Court has recognised the mafia’s and camorra’s involvement. 
We can also define it as a case of ‘imperfect forgetting’. In Italy it is 
remembered as the ‘Christmas Attack’ because it took place two days 
before Christmas, when many Italians were travelling from North to 
South Italy, or from South to North, in order to be with their families for 
the holidays. But those on the 904 express would not reach their final 
destinations. Initially 15 of them died, and the toll then rose to 17; the 
number of injured was 267. The Association of Relatives of the Victims of 
the Attack on Train 904, founded on 17 March 1985 in Naples, describes 
the massacre thus on its website:
Those who organized the explosion, aimed at killing innocent citizens. Every- 
thing was planned to cause the highest number of victims as possible: the 
Christ- mas holiday, the power of the explosion, the timer of the bomb 
regulated in such a way to blow up inside the tunnel in coincidence 
with the transit of another train on the opposite track. Only the prompt 
reaction of the driver who immedi- ately stopped the line avoided a more 
dramatic disaster. The bomb on the Christmas train was an anomalous 
act of terrorism, where more clearly the extension of criminal logics, their 
reciprocal connections may be observed. It is a terrorist act where the 
shadow of the Mafia is behind the terrorist organization. The enemy is 
multilateral and hidden, based on many members both inside and outside 
the country. (Associations of Relatives of the Victims, Train 904, 1985, www.
treno904.org)
Since 1984, the public remembrances of this massacre have not 
become a stable cultural form because of a lack of visibility. There are 
several complex reasons for this: (1) after almost three decades (1984–
2013) there has been no serious endeavour to provide justice and 
truth to the survivors and their relatives; (2) the state has been deemed 
guilty of secretly mandating the attack, and  (3) this past has been 
contested. However, the most significant feature of this memory has 
4  The following two sections of text summarize the results of a study on the public 
memory surrounding the terrorist attack in San Benedetto Val di Sambro (December 23 
1984) published previously in amended form in Tota (2005a). However, these date are here 
used to document the impossibility in the case of Naples to take for granted a free civil 
society and a free public sphere where to project the trauma claim. In other terms, this 
example is used to document the inapplicability of the cultural trauma model to these 
contexts where the democratic rights of citizens are suspended.
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been its invisibility both nationally and locally. The massacre on Train 904 
occurred only 29 years ago during a period of peace in a European 
democracy. How can it be forgotten? My earlier case study on the 
attack (Tota, 2005a) documents how an extremely powerful lobby 
jointly representing the camorra, terrorist organizations, and political 
powers has systematically disrupted public memory of this event. But 
there are additional reasons for the cultural amnesia, and they partly 
concern the fragmentation of the commemorative processes. 
Since 1984, the victims of Train 904 have been commemorated 
in a highly disjointed manner: a number of ceremonies are held during 
the year and in different areas of the country. But instead of inscribing 
memory of the Christmas Attack firmly in the public national discourse, 
these ceremonies have generated ambiguity and confusion. The 
plurality of the ceremonies has unintentionally contributed to the 
event’s invisibility because it fragments the nationwide attention to 
the attack. It is so fragmented that it is even difficult to be properly 
described. This fragmentation is linked to the fact that there are three 
different terrorist attacks partially commemorated together:
1. The Bologna Train Station Bombing: On the morning of 2 August, 
1980 there was a terrorist bombing at the Central Station in 
Bologna. The attack killed 85 people and wounded more than 
200. The attack has been materially attributed to the neo-fascist 
Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR). It is commemorated on 2 
August every year.
2. The Italicus Attack: In the early hours of 4 August 1974, a bomb 
exploded on The Italicus Express night train on which, killing 12 
people and injuring 48. The train was travelling from Rome to 
Munich and it was near San Benedetto Val di Sambro when 
the explosion occurred at approximately 01:23. Former Primer 
Minister of Italy Aldo Moro was on the train on 3 August, but 
disembarked before the explosion. Here it is important to note 
that Aldo Moro was kidnapped some years later on March 16, 
1978, by the Red Brigades, a Marxist terrorist organization, and 
killed after 55 days of captivity. This bombing is commemorated 
every year together with the bombing of Bologna on 2 August, 
with a train departing from Bologna immediately after the 
commemorative ceremony for the victims of Bologna.
3. The Train 904 Bombing/The Christmas Massacre: On December 
23, 1984 a bomb detonated on the 904 Naples-Milan express 
while it was in the Apennine Base Tunnel. A total of 17 were 
killed and the attack wounded a further 267. The explosion 
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occurred quite close to the site of the Italicus attack ten years 
prior. The victims of the Train 904 are commemorated with the 
following ceremonies:
a. August 2 (annually) – The anniversary of the 1980 
Bologna attack, the Train 904 attack is commemorated 
together with this attack and the Italicus attack in San 
Benedetto Val di Sambro. This commemoration takes 
place at the railway station of San Benedetto Val di 
Sambro, the station nearest to the site of the explosion 
located 40 kilometres from Bologna.
b. December 23 (annually) – Small ceremony at the railway 
station of San Benedetto Val di Sambro.
c. December 23 (annually) – Small ceremony at the 
Central station in Naples, from which the train had 
departed.
 There are several factors that can explain this fragmentation. 
First, the explosion occurred deep within the tunnel at a place 
very difficult place to reach on foot. As a consequence, the 
commemorative ceremony cannot be held in its most symbolic 
location but has had to be moved to San Benedetto, the nearest 
railway. Because many victims were residents of Naples, it seemed 
unreasonable to organize the ceremony somewhere so anonymous 
and distant for them (a small railway station in northern Italy) rather than 
at the central railway station in Naples. Yet this solution was problematic 
as well, because in Naples the camorra obstructs every attempt to 
commemorate the victims properly (as we shall see). Moreover, the 
San Benedetto commemoration ceremony on 2 August has produced 
only a sort of ‘side’ visibility, for it is a joint commemoration of three 
different attacks with national attention entirely concentrated on the 
victims of the Bologna attacks. These are victims who are remembered 
in their city in exactly the place where the explosion occurred, on the 
exact anniversary of the attack, and by exactly the same citizens who 
ran into the station after the explosion, gave first aid to the injured, 
and helped the firemen to extract the bodies from the rubble. As part 
of this commemoration, a special train leaves Bologna station for San 
Benedetto Val di Sambro at exactly 11:15. At the end of this 20 minute 
journey, wreaths are laid on those plaques dedicated to the memory of 
the Icarus and Train 904 bombings.
82
Journal of Terrorism Research Vol. 4 No. 1
Train 904: The Commemorative Ceremonies and the Cultural Amnesiant 
at Work
As mentioned, the attack on Train 904 is remembered during the 
commemoration of the Bologna bombing every 2 August. However, 
the focus here is on the two other commemorations of the terrorist 
attack on Train 904, those held on 23 December in San Benedetto Val di 
Sambro (the nearest railway station to the place of the explosion which 
occurred inside a tunnel) and Naples (the railway station from which 
the train 904 had departed that fateful evening in 1984). 
The San Benedetto Val di Sambro Commemoration (23 December)
The annual ceremony in San Benedetto is held in the small 
square outside the station. A small plaque has been installed for the 
victims of the 904 Train massacre. The entire ceremony lasts twenty 
minutes. Every year with the voice of a railroad worker opens the 
ceremony. Amplified by a loudspeaker, the worker recalls the names 
of the victims of the bombing and invites those present to observe 
a minute of silence. A locomotive whistle is sounded to begin the 
moment of silence with a second whistle marking its closure 60 seconds 
later. The banners of the municipalities, which surround the monument 
to the Italicus victims, are raised in tribute to the victims. Soldiers present 
at the ceremony stand to attention, and each year the local priest of 
San Benedetto reads a different Bible passage in commemoration of 
the victims. Then the victims’ relatives lay the wreaths near the plaque. 
Political and institutional representatives take part in the ceremony, 
yet they never address those present. The mayor of San Benedetto 
always makes the effort to attend, as do the presidents of the regional 
and provincial authorities, representatives of the Jewish community 
in Bologna and the presidents of the other victims’ associations. The 
victims of Train 904 have been commemorated every 23 December 
since 1985. The ceremony concludes with a large buffet lunch 
offered by the mayor to all present and served in the station bar. In 
San Benedetto the only authority that speaks is the Church. Another 
distinctive feature of the Val di Sambro ceremony is the rhetorical 
device of the railroad worker’s voice, which is broadcast from a 
loudspeaker to mark the beginning of the commemorative ceremony. 
At the specific request of the victims’ families, the victims of the Italicus 
attack are also remembered in this ceremony. 
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The Naples Central Station Commemoration (23 December)
The participation by citizens in both ceremonies is invariably 
scant, but this is especially so in Naples. Local and national newspapers 
publish few reports on the event, with it never gracing the front pages. 
Since 1994 (a full ten years after the attacks), a commemorative 
ceremony has been held in Naples’ Central Station. This is a brief 
ceremony and it takes place at the platform from which Train 904. 
However, until 23 December 2003 there were no symbols of the 
bombing within the station. For the first nine years of these ceremonies, 
there was little option but to lay the wreaths on the ground at the very 
end of the platform. After many difficulties, in 2002 the Victims’ Relatives 
Association was able to finally manage to have a commemorative 
plaque installed at the Central Station. It was unveiled by Rosa Russo 
Jervolino, at the time the city’s newly-elected mayor. After waiting for 
19 years, this plaque remains the only tribute to the victims. It is also the 
only official symbol of the bombing granted to the victims and their 
relatives by the municipality of Naples. 
There is evidence that the organization of any form of 
commemoration or any attempt to construct legitimate symbols of this 
memory in Naples clash with the Camorra’s determination to have the 
bombings forgotten. Only seven people attended the mass celebrated 
to commemorate the victims on the third anniversary of the attacks. 
For the following year (1988), Riccardo Meschini, the president of the 
Victims’ Relatives Association, who was injured alongside his wife in 
the explosion, attempted to organize a concert of sacred music in the 
local cathedral as part of commemorations. At first, Monsignor Graziosi 
assisted the association, but ultimately Cardinal Giordano called 
the concert off. At the time Giuseppe Misso, a prominent Camorra 
boss, was on trial in Florence for the attacks and there were fears of 
retaliation for the cathedral’s participation, expecially given that the 
cathedral borders the Forcella neighborhood controlled by Misso’s 
clan. Though the Victims’ Relatives Association sought the support of 
priests at other churches in different neighbourhoods around the city, 
they all refused to help. Among those churches approached were: San 
Gennaro Cathedral, San Francesco di Paola, San Ferdinando, Santa 
Maria degli Angeli, and San Giacomo degli Spagnoli. While there was 
never a concert, there were several articles published in local and 
national newspapers that accused Cardinal Giordano of collusion with 
the Camorra. When interviewed by a journalist, he denied the charge 
claiming that:
Personally I have never received any request from the Victims’ Relatives 
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Association concerning use of the Cathedral for a commemorative 
concert, nor do I know of any request made to the parish priests of other 
churches in Naples . . . As regards the use of churches for non-religious 
purposes, the dispositions set out by the Pope are very strict . . . Obviously 
the decisions of the priests have complied with those criteria and any 
different interpretation of what happened is tendentious and bizarre. (Il 
Mattino, 24 December 1988)
On 24 December 1988, one of the most important daily 
newspapers in Italy, the Corriere della Sera, published an article 
headlined “The Church is Afraid of the Camorra. The commemorative 
concert organised in memory of the dead on Train 904 will not take 
place because of the denial of the parish priests.” Il Tempo on the same 
day also published an article about the situation under the headline of 
“No church in Naples is willing to commemorate the attacks. Too much 
fear of reprisals by Misso’s Clan.” While it would be easy to misrepresent 
the Catholic Church’s role in opposing both the camorra and the 
Mafia across much of southern Italy, it also needs to be remembered 
that over the past 30 years this courageous defense of the citizenry has 
lead to the death of numerous priests at the hands of the camorra and 
similar organizations. 
This is only one example, though an emblematic one. The list of 
individual decisions, events, and activities that over the past 30 years 
have constructed a situation of invisible memory is very long indeed. 
The catalogue of inaction by local institutions, silences and humiliates 
victims and their relatives, unequivocally demonstrating that ‘imperfect 
oblivion’ requires constant work: All initiatives must be blocked, all 
witnesses silenced and all symbols destroyed. On 5 March 1991, the 
life sentences given to Pippo Calò, Guido Cercola, Giuseppe Misso, 
Luigi Cardone, Giulio Pirozzi, and Alfonso Galeotta were suspended by 
Judge Corrado Carnevale. The municipality of Naples has remained 
silent, but numerous posters exulting Giuseppe Misso’s release 
appeared on the streets. 
There is another example which can be considered emblematic 
of the emergence of this cultural amnesia: the history of the plaque 
installed in Casoria, a town near Naples. Among the victims of the 
Train 904 attack was an entire family: Angela (33 years old), Anna 
(nine), Giovanni (four), and Nicola de Simone (40). Because Nicola 
worked at the National Electricity Board (ENEL), the ENEL trade union 
endeavoured for many years to organize commemorative occasions. 
Moreover, Angela’s sister, Titta Calvanese, worked at the primary 
school, and the teachers of that school organised several initiatives. In 
late January 1985 (one month after the attack), the mayor of Casoria 
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unveiled a bronze plaque bearing the names of all the victims in the 
main square near city hall. By 2004, the plaque had become dirty and 
neglected. In interview with the author, Titta Calvanese commented, 
“Luckily the plaque is not on the ground; otherwise they would park on 
it.” The ‘imperfect’ oblivion into which this attack has fallen cannot be 
blamed on other processes. It is due, not simply to the inertia of citizens 
but to their fear of retaliation following on from the logic of terrorism 
itself. In many cases of state-sanctioned terror, the battle against 
terrorism must be constantly fought in civil society. It is a war - a war of 
symbols and a war against a ‘disculture’ that must be changed. 
Still, the most interesting case is related to that small 
commemorative plaque the Central Station in Naples previously 
mentioned installed in 2002. In August 2008, after having read 
Tota’s article (2005) on the Train 904 attack, a group of Canadian 
students attending a summer school on peace and terrorism at the 
University of Siena in Italy who were interested in the bombing and its 
commemoration went with their Canadian professor Joseph Fletcher 
to visit the Central Station in Naples. When they arrived in Naples, they 
looked for the commemorative plaque but discovered that it had 
been removed. No one in the Central Station knew anything about 
the plaque or about Train 904. After finally finding a railway worker, he 
explained to the group that the plaque had been removed because 
the railway station was under renovation. Surprised the Canadian 
professor asked him where exactly the railway station was ‘under 
renovation’ because they could not see any workers inside the station. 
The railwayman replied, “Just that wall, where there was the plaque, 
was under renovation.” Even, such a small commemorative plaque was 
a too powerful sign of commemoration for camorra and it had to be 
removed. However, now the plaque is again at its place in the Central 
Station and it represents with its few words a small tribute in memory of 
those citizens of Naples who lost their lives in the bombing.
Total cultural amnesia is at work in reference to the terrorist attack 
on Train 904. Its inscription in public discourse is almost impossible. 
All attempts to create symbols of memory have not succeeded. 
As it occurred less than 30 years ago, many of the survivors are still 
alive as are many of the victims’ relatives. There are collective and 
individual memories of the event, but there is not any ‘social memory’, 
(Halbwachs, 1968), not any ‘cultural memory’, (Assmann, 1992), not 
any ‘public memory’. (Phillips Kendall, 2004) As camorra is involved, 
the violence never fully stopped. The place of violence cannot be 
tranformed into a place of collective remembering. It cannot be 
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reloaded with new meanings. In this case the cultural trauma process 
cannot be carried out in either the legal and political arenas, nor can it 
be carried out in the artistic ones. Coming back to Alexander’s model 
(2004), it would be misleading to say that a carrier group able to work 
through the representation of the event is missing. The very problem 
here is that violence is ongoing and its cessation is a necessary, even 
if not sufficient, condition for reloading the space of violence with 
new meanings. The carrier group cannot project the trauma claim to 
the audience, simply because they risk their own and families’ lifes. In 
this case the fact that something that most citizens know of (the terror 
attack) cannot be mentioned in the public discourse becomes the 
symbol of the power of camorra in that geographic area. The citizens’ 
silence is the tangible sign of how camorra can be seen to be more 
powerful than the state in that part of the Italian territory. 
While in the first case analysed in this article (state terror) the 
counter-memories ultimately contribute to making democracy possible, 
in ones of like the second case (Train 904) the public denial of the 
trauma is strategically used by camorra and mafia to reaffirm the 
power of the criminal organization in that region, forming a kind of 
‘counter-state’. The ‘politics of regret’ cannot be applied to this case. 
(Olick, 2007) The state does not have enough power. It does not have 
the territorial sovereignity. The question that arises is the following: who 
has the control over the recent Italian past? Who has the power to 
recall what happened and who lacks the opportunity to tell the truth?
In this second case there are still individual and collective 
memories, but any form of social memory (in Halbwachsian sense) 
is missing. But what will happen when the survivors and the victims’ 
relatives die? Over time the individual and collective memories do 
not resist ‘official’ memories if they are not embedded and sustained 
through cultural forms (symbols, commemorative practices, etc). In this 
case, that past will become invisible. It will be latent, invisible, but will 
remain there as active agent, as active force to be prompted suddenly 
one day, to be rediscovered and reactualised. This is a strange quality 
of trauma. At what level and where do traumatic events continue to 
exist, even in invisibility? 
Perhaps we could imagine that places were violent actions 
occurred have their own memory – a memory of the place and the 
space - where information is stored independently from the fact that 
some individuals remember them. Why do we say that we have to 
rember the past to avoid its repetition? Why does the invisible, the 
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forgotten past come back? What kind of relationship is there linking the 
past, the present and the future? These questions are very difficult to 
answer and they are open issues for future debate. The fact that they 
are difficult should not prevent us from further invetigating them.
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